This study uses multivariate cointegration and variance decomposition techniques to investigate the causal relationship between government expenditures and economic growth for Egypt, Israel and Syria, for the past three decades. When testing for causality within a bivariate system of total government spending and economic growth, we find bi-directional causality from government spending to economic growth with a negative long-term relationship between the two variables. However, when testing for causality within a trivariate system -the share of government civilian expenditures in GDP, military burden and economic growth -we find that the military burden negatively affects economic growth for all the countries, and that civilian government expenditures cause positive economic growth in Israel and Egypt.
Introduction
The relationship between government expenditure (aggregate as well as disaggregated into its major components including defense spending) and economic growth has attracted considerable interest among economists and policy makers.
Empirical analyses of the impact of overall government expenditure on longrun economic growth include, among others, Feder (1983) , Landau (1983) , Ram (1983 Ram ( , 1986 , Grier and Tullock (1989) , Romer (1989) , Barro (1990 Barro ( , 1991 , Levine and Renelt (1992) , Devarajan et al. (1996) , and Sala-i-Martin (1997) . The majority of these studies used cross-section analysis to link measures of government spending with economic growth rates and produced mixed evidence; the most common results show that government expenditure is detrimental to economic growth. Most of the evidence emerged from cross-section growth regressions [à la Barro (1991) ] that provided only pooled estimates of the effects of government expenditure on economic growth. Cross-country growth regressions do not capture the dynamics of the relationship between these two variables and disregard country-specific factors.
Another pitfall of these studies is that when economic growth was regressed on a wide spectrum of variables, researchers interpreted a significant coefficient of the measure of government expenditure as a confirmation of causality from government spending to economic growth. However, a significant coefficient in this equation can be equally compatible with the Keynesian view -causality from government expenditure to growth, or with Wagner's Law -from growth to government expenditure as well as with a bi-directional causality between the two variables. Typical growth regressions provide no insights into the direction of causality but rather focus on associating government spending and a host of variables with economic growth. Recently some empirical studies have begun testing for the direction of causality between government spending and economic growth by using time series data and applying Granger causality tests. The studies that used these techniques focused mainly on developed countries where long-term series data are available. [Ahsan et al. (1989) , Bharat et al. (2000) , and Ghali (1998) 
among others]
Cross-section growth regressions have been used to assess the relationship between military spending and economic growth. As when examining overall government spending, the evidence that emerged was mixed and subject to criticism due to the use of inappropriate empirical techniques. For example, Benoit (1973 Benoit ( , 1978 used the Spearman rank order correlation and regression analysis to show that military spending positively affects economic growth in a sample of 44 LDCs (less developed countries) between 1950-1965. However, most other studies found a negative effect of defense spending either directly [Fiani et al. (1984) , Lim (1983) ] or indirectly through their negative impact on saving, [Deger and Smith (1985) ] investment, [Deger and Sen (1983) ] or exports. [Rothschild (1977) ] Biswas and Ram (1986) found no consistent, statistically significant connection between military spending and economic growth. Aware of the severe pitfalls of cross section analysis, Dakurah et al. (2001) used cointegration and error correction models to study the causal relationship between the military burden and economic growth for 62 countries and found no common causal relationship between military spending and growth among these countries.
Among the countries that have received little attention in the empirical literature on the relationship between government expenditure and economic growth are the countries of the Middle East, which are characterized by large fiscal imbalances due to high expenditures and the vulnerability of government revenues to external shocks. Moreover, due to the long-standing Israeli-Arab conflict, the military burden, as proxied by the share of government spending devoted to military expenditures, is very high by international standards. Almost all of these countries have undertaken some fiscal adjustments -mainly through reducing expenditures. However, with the rapidly growing population and the vulnerability of revenues to external shocks, sustained per capita economic growth is still a major challenge. There is an increasing awareness among policymakers of the need to promote a macroeconomic environment that would be conducive to private investment and economic growth. Given the dominant role of the public sectors in Mid-East economies, especially in terms of the resources they control, their contribution to output and their impact on economic incentives, public finance reform and reallocating expenditures to productive areas are important factors for coping with this challenge. [Eken et al. (1997) ] Thus it is important to identify which government functions are productive and which are not. While there have been several attempts to investigate the relationship between military expenditures and economic growth for Mid-East countries, [Askari and Corbo (1974) , Cohen and Ward (1996) , DeRouen, K. (1995) , Lebovic and Ishaq (1987), among others] to the best of our knowledge there have been no investigations of the causal relationship between the various components of government spending separated into productive and nonproductive spending and economic growth.
Thus, the purpose of the present study is to fill this gap by modeling shortrun and long-run dynamic interactions between civilian and military government spending and economic growth, and by testing for the direction of causality between these variables for Egypt, Israel, and Syria. The reason for choosing these particular countries is that they are major participants in the Israeli-Arab conflict and thus endure substantial military burdens. Additionally, long-run data is available for these countries, which enable us to assess the causal relationships between aggregate and disaggregated government spending, and economic growth.
To do so we used multivariate Johansen's (1988) cointegration test and Granger causality tests. In particular, we modeled the relationship between real GDP growth, share of government civilian expenditures in GDP, and military expenses using a vector error-correction (VEC) model and test for the direction of Granger causality between these variables. We also assessed the relative importance of each variable in explaining changes in the growth rate of real GDP beyond the sample period by using variance decomposition and impulse-response functions. We pay particular attention to data stationarity, the choice of the optimal lag-length and testing for cointegration among the variables.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework of the relationship between the components of government expenditures and economic growth; Section 3 explains the empirical methodology we applied in this study; Section 4 presents the data and results; and Section 5 concludes the paper.
Theoretical Background
A subject of intense debate for economists has been whether the government should intervene to correct for short-run fluctuations in economic activity. While the Classical economists oppose intervention, the Keynesian school of thought advocates the use of fiscal policies to boost economic activity in times of recessions. Classical economists believe that market forces swiftly bring the economy to long-run equilibrium through adjustment in the labor market, while Keynesians allege that the assumed self-regulating mechanisms in the economy fail to lead the economy back to equilibrium mainly due to rigidities in the labor market. Thus, Keynesians prescribe expansionary fiscal policies to avoid long recessions.
Classicals and Neoclassicals deem fiscal policies ineffective on the grounds of the well-known crowding-out phenomenon, i.e. as public spending rises, public goods are substituted for private goods, thus causing lower private spending on education, health, transportation and other goods and services. Furthermore, when governments borrow heavily to fund spending, pressures in the credit market result in higher interest rates which hamper private investment. In practice, the effectiveness of fiscal policies may be hindered by the relatively long time lags from recognizing a need for action until realizing the results of the policies.
The argument that fiscal policies enhance economic growth has gained additional support with the introduction of new growth theories. Unlike the Neoclassical growth model as formulated by Solow (1956) , which did not prescribe the channels through which government spending may influence long-run economic growth, the new growth theorists 1 suggest that there is both a temporary effect from government intervention during the transition to equilibrium, and a possible long-term effect from government spending on economic growth.
In order to examine the role of government in the economy, it is important to pinpoint the main areas and channels wherein government actions can affect economic growth by means of economic activity. Government actions may be However, government actions may also retard economic activities. For example, competition between the less efficient public sector and the private sector in the credit market often leads to an increase in interest rates, which reduces private investment, and eventually hampers economic growth. Also, taxes imposed by the government can distort market prices and resource allocations.
The arguments so far were that government expenditure has either a positive or negative effect on economic growth. Wagner's (1890) and production activities that spread to the civilian sector. [Benoit (1973 [Benoit ( , 1978 Military spending can also affect economic growth positively through an expansion of aggregate demand (the Keynesian effect). The resulting increased demand leads to the increased utilization of otherwise idle capital, higher employment and profits, and therefore higher investment, all of which cause economic growth. In contrast to Benoit, Joerding (1986) argues that causality runs from economic growth to military spending. He claims that a growing country may want to strengthen itself against foreign or domestic threats by increasing its military spending.
In sum, the foregoing discussion suggests four possible causal relationships between economic growth and military expenditures: unidirectional causality from military expenditures to economic growth, or vice versa; bi-directional causality between the two variables; and finally, a lack of any causal relationship.
In the following section we will describe the econometric methodology we apply to test for Granger causality between government civilian and military expenditures in Egypt, Israel and Syria.
Empirical Methodology Standard Granger Causality (SGC)
According to the Granger's (1969) This test is based on an estimate of the following regression:
where 0 a is a drift; t represents a time trend; and p is a large enough lag length to ensure that t ε is a white noise process. Using the results of DickeyFuller (1979) , the null hypothesis that the variable x is nonstationary (
rejected if β is significantly negative. Since it has been shown that ADF tests are sensitive to lag lengths [Campbell and Perron (1991) ] we determine the optimal lag length by using Akaike's information criterion (AIC). 
where ECT t-1 is the error correction term lagged one period, z is a third endogenous variable in the system; and k ij , β describes the effect of the k-th lagged value of variable j on the current value of variable i; i,j=x,y,z. The it ε are mutually uncorrelated white noise residuals. By rejecting the null, we conclude that variable j Granger-causes variable i. These tests differ from the standard causality tests in that they include error correction terms (ECT t-1 ) that account for the existence of cointegration among the variables.
At least one variable in Equations (5) to (7) should move to bring the relation back into equilibrium if there is a true economic relation, and therefore at least one of the coefficients of the error correction terms has to be significantly different from zero. [Granger (1988)] 
Data and Empirical Findings
A.
Data and definitions of variables
As a measure of government size, we use the ratio of total nominal government expenditures to nominal GDP expressed in the natural logarithm,
LGY Egypt (1975 -1998 ), Israel (1967 -1998 ), and Syria (1973 -1998 . To account for the possible effects of the reform policies in Israel in 1985 and in Egypt in 1991 we use two dummy variables -IL85 and EGY91 -that take the value zero prior to the reform and the value of one thereafter.
B. Granger Causality Results
The first step in our empirical work was to determine the degree of integration of each variable. The ADF test results are reported in Table 1 Table 2 show that total government expenditures have a negative long-run relationship with economic growth in Israel and Syria. The negative outcome is consistent with earlier empirical studies where government expenditures were found to affect economic growth adversely when the standard OLS method was applied. On the other hand, the trivariate cointegration results in Table 2 show that the military burden affects long-run economic growth negatively in both countries, whereas civilian government expenditures affect economic growth positively in Israel, but negatively in Syria.
Now that cointegration has been determined in the cases of Israel and Syria, we apply the ECM to detect the direction of causality between the variables. To test for causality in Egypt where variables are of different integration orders in levels and therefore are not cointegrated, we apply the standard Granger causality (SGC) in first differences. The main results of the causality tests from Tables 3   and 4 can be summarized as follows:
(a) In Table 3 , where a bivariate system of total government expenditures and GDP was utilized, bidirectional long-run causality was detected in Israel and Syria by virtue of the significance of the lagged error terms. As we mentioned, the long-run relationship between these two variables is negative. For
Egypt we detected short-term unidirectional causality from economic growth to government spending.
(b) In productive spending is required to achieve higher growth rates.
Another important finding is that neither economic growth nor civilian government spending caused a military burden, supporting earlier studies that military spending in the Middle East is determined mainly by regional or internal threats.
C. Results of variance decompositions and impulse-response functions
The empirical findings above reveal that while causality between government civilian spending and economic growth is bidirectional, negative unidirectional long-term causality from military burdens to economic growth is evident in the three countries. The objective of this section is to determine the relative importance of each variable in explaining output growth-rate beyond the sample period for each of the three countries. We do this by using variance decomposition and impulse response functions (IRFs).
Considering the VEC model in Equations 5-7, a change in any one of the random innovations z y x i it , , , = ε will immediately change the value of the dependent variable and thus the future values of the other two variables through the dynamic structure of the system. Since an innovation in each of the three variables produces changes in the future growth of the real GDP, it is possible to break down the forecast-error variance of economic growth in each future period and to determine the percentage of variance that each variable explains. We also obtain the response of the economic growth rate to one standard deviation of government civilian and military expenditures for the following twenty years. We report results for periods of one, two, five, ten, and twenty years. Since the innovations are not necessarily uncorrelated, the residuals are orthogonalized using the Choleski decomposition in order to obtain a diagonal covariance matrix of the resulting innovations and to isolate the effects of each variable on economic growth. Table 5 presents the proportions of the forecast-error variance of economic growth that are attributable to its own random innovation shocks and to those of government civilian and military expenditures. The main results in Tables 5 and 6 can be summarized as follows: 
Concluding Remarks
Our aim in this study was to see if there is a causal relationship between government expenditures, both the civilian and military components, and economic growth in three MENA countries wherein governments play major roles in the economies and large proportions of spending go to the military. Since government spending is believed to underlie the macroeconomic instability and low growth rates in these countries during the past three decades, we examined the effect of reducing government expenditures and/or reallocating them to see if this would lead to higher economic growth rates Since these economies are among those with the highest military burdens, we were particularly interested to determine if they The implications of our analysis are straightforward: Egypt, Israel, and Syria could reap peace dividends by reducing their military burdens. However, the effect of channeling the freed resources to civilian uses on economic growth is not as clear as the direct effect. In the cases of Egypt and Israel, shifting resources from military to civilian spending seems to enhance long-run economic growth; in the case of Syria resources must be reallocated from unproductive civilian activities to productive ones in order to foster economic growth. Therefore, reallocating resources from military to civilian spending may not result in increased growth unless the civilian allocation favors productive activities. LGDP, LGY, LMY, LCGY are the natural logarithms of real GDP, the natural logarithm of ratio of total nominal government expenditures to nominal GDP, the natural logarithm of the military burden, and the natural logarithm of the ratio of government civilian expenditures to GDP, respectively. § The lag lengths that were chosen by Akaike's selection criterion did not guarantee white noise residuals, therefore the reported lag lengths were chosen to guarantee white noise in residuals.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
LM (4) LGDP, LGY, LMY, LCGY are the natural logarithms of real GDP, the natural logarithm of ratio of total nominal government expenditures to nominal GDP, the natural logarithm of the military burden, and the natural logarithm of the ratio of government civilian expenditures to GDP, respectively. *; **; *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. λ max is the maximum eigenvalue statistic. p* represents the optimal lag length based on AIC from the unrestricted VAR model. r* is the number of cointegration vectors based on Johansen's method. LGY ∆ 0 -0.209** Notes:
LGDP, LGY, LMY, LCGY are the natural logarithms of real GDP, the natural logarithm of ratio of total nominal government expenditures to nominal GDP, the natural logarithm of the military burden, and the natural logarithm of the ratio of government civilian expenditures to GDP, respectively.
The values in the ECM column are the coefficients of the error correction terms in the relevant equation. The numerical entries in the columns of
LGY and LGDP ∆ ∆ are the Wald test statistic values for testing the null hypotheses that all coefficients of the lags of these variables in the equation of the dependent variable are zeroes. *; **; *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Lag lengths of the three variables were determined using Akaike's information criterion with maximum lags of 4 allowed for each variable. LM(4) is the Lagrange Multiplier test for up to the fourth-order serial correlation in the residuals, which is asymptotically distributed 2 ) 4 ( χ . LGDP, LGY, LMY, LCGY are the natural logarithms of real GDP, the natural logarithm of the ratio of total nominal government expenditures to nominal GDP, the natural logarithm of the military burden, and the natural logarithm of the ratio of government civilian expenditures to GDP, respectively.
The values in the ECM column are the coefficients of the error correction terms in the relevant equation. The numerical entries in the columns of ∆LGDP, ∆LCGY, and ∆LMY are the Wald test statistic values for testing the null hypotheses that all coefficients of the lags of these variables in the equation of the dependent variable are zeroes.
*; **; *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Lag lengths of the three variables were determined using Akaike's AIC method, with maximum lags of 4 allowed for each variable.
LM (4) is the Lagrange Multiplier test for up to the fourth-order serial correlation in the residuals, which is asymptotically distributed 2 ) 9 ( χ The results are based on an unrestricted three-variable VAR system of LGDP, LCGY, and LMEY. The results are based on an unrestricted three-variable VAR system of LGDP, LCGY, and LMEY.
